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Assessing the Effects of Ownership Change on Women and Minority Employees:  
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data  
 
Abstract 
  While there have been numerous papers on the employment and wage effects of mergers 
and acquisitions, there has been no direct analysis of the impact of such ownership changes on 
minority and female workers.   This is an unexplored “equity” dimension of these transactions.  
We  fill  this  gap  by  analyzing  linked  employer-employee  data  for  the  entire  population  of 
Swedish workers and approximately 16,000 manufacturing plants for the period 1985-1998.  For 
each worker employed in these establishments (as well as the entire population of workers), we 
have  data  on  gender,  age,  national  origin,  level  of  education,  type  of  education,  location, 
industrial sector, annual earnings, as well as each employee’s complete work history during the 
period.  We also have data on numerous plant and firm-level characteristics, which allows us to 
control  for  additional  factors  that  might  result  in  changes  in  labor  composition  and  relative 
compensation.    Our  findings  suggest  that  ownership  change  does  not  significantly  alter  the 
relative earnings and employment status of minority and female workers.    
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JEL Codes: G34, J23, J31, C81   3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The  recent  resurgence  in  mergers  and  acquisitions  has  focused  greater  attention  on 
assessing  the  impact  of  these  transactions  on  workers.    Some  scholars  have  asserted  that 
corporate takeovers have deleterious effects on workers.  For example, Shleifer and Summers 
(1987) conjecture that the new owners of a firm in the aftermath of a hostile takeover are more 
likely to abrogate implicit contracts with employees, with respect to wages, benefits, and pension 
contributions.    More  specifically,  they  assert  that  shareholder  wealth  creation  arising  from 
corporate takeovers need not reflect improvements in economic welfare or efficiency.  Instead, 
the increase in economic performance may reflect a transfer of wealth from employees and other 
non-financial stakeholders to shareholders.  
More generally, we may wish to assess whether there are changes in equity, as well as 
efficiency, in the aftermath of a merger or acquisition.  One such equity issue concerns whether 
these transactions have differential effects on female and minority workers.  There is a vast 
theoretical and empirical literature on discriminatory bias in labor force practices, such as hiring 
and compensation.  There have also been numerous empirical studies of the employment and 
wage effects of mergers and acquisitions at the plant and firm-levels (Brown and Medoff (1988), 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a, 1990b), McGuckin et al. (1998), McGuckin and Nguyen 
(2001), Conyon et al. (2002a, 2002b, 2004), and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)).  To the best of 
our knowledge, these studies have not directly considered the relationship between ownership 
change and workforce diversity and relative compensation.   
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing a unique file that links economic 
and demographic data, which allows us to assess the labor market consequences of ownership 
change for women and minorities.  Although there have been several papers on the employment   4 
and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions, the unit of analysis in such studies is typically the 
plant or firm.  In contrast, the unit of observation in our study is the individual worker, which 
allows us to provide direct, systematic empirical evidence on the effects of ownership change on 
various types of workers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the following section, we briefly 
review empirical studies of the employment and wage effects of ownership change and describe 
their limitations for assessing the impact of these transactions on workforce diversity.  Section III 
outlines our econometric framework.  Section IV describes the data and the construction of key 
variables.  Empirical results are presented in Section V, followed by preliminary conclusions in 
the final section of the paper.     
 
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF PLANT AND FIRM-LEVEL STUDIES OF THE    
     EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP CHANGE  
 
   In recent decades, there has been a substantial increase in the female labor participation 
rate and higher levels of educational attainment among women and minorities.  In 1987, the 
Hudson Institute estimated that 85% of the new entrants to the labor force will be minorities and 
women and companies responded to this prediction.
1  Specifically capitalizing on these trends 
and  outreach  programs  to  exacerbate  them,  many  corporations  have  devoted  substantial 
resources to enhancing and managing “diversity.”  Most large companies have developed an 
infrastructure, typically subsumed in the human resource management function, to monitor and 
evaluate diversity.  Thus, for many firms, enhancing workforce diversity is considered to be a 
strategic objective.   
                                                 
1See Johnston and Packer (1987).   5 
  Diversity professionals often assess performance based on an explicit consideration of the 
racial  and  gender  composition  of  the  workforce.    One  perspective  on  this  issue  involves 
examining whether the workforce is “representative,” in terms of the racial and gender profile of 
the  population-at-large  or  the  local  labor  market.    Consistent  with  this  view,  managerial 
decisions regarding selection, retention, and promotion have been made on the basis of diversity 
criteria.   While many companies do not have explicit quotas or targets, there is strong pressure 
on corporate managers to move in this direction.  For many diversity professionals, a workforce 
that is representative constitutes an “optimal” mix of workers.   
  Despite the considerable attention devoted to these issues, there is a remarkable lack of 
empirical  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  diversity  and  changes  in  corporate  control.  
Instead, such studies have focused on employment and wage effects for employees in general.  
Table  1  summarizes  selected  plant  and  firm-level  studies  of  the  impact  of  mergers  and 
acquisitions on workers.  Much of the plant-level evidence seems to indicate that ownership 
change  does  not  result  in  statistically  significant  declines  in  the  employment  and  wages  of 
production workers at production establishments.  The most comprehensive evidence, presented 
in McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), suggests that wages and employment increase after ownership 
change.  On the other hand, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a) find that employment and wage 
growth are lower in central office or “auxiliary” establishments in the aftermath of an ownership 
change, suggesting that white-collar workers suffer more than blue-collar employees when such 
transactions occur.  
Table 1 also reveals that these effects vary by type of ownership change.  For instance, 
Baldwin (1998) reported that mergers in Canada had a negative impact on employment and 
compensation  of  non-production  workers.    Conyon,  Girma,  Thompson,  and  Wright  (2002a)   6 
report similar results, based on firm-level data from the U.K.  The authors also find greater 
declines  in  employment  associated  with  related  mergers,  relative  to  those  associated  with 
unrelated mergers.  In a subsequent paper (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2004)), they 
report  that  wage  increases  tend  to  follow  mergers,  especially  related  mergers.    Gugler  and 
Yurtoglu (2004) compare the employment effects of U.S. and European mergers.  The authors 
find that there is a 10% decline in labor demand in the aftermath of mergers involving European 
firms.  Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that 45% of the firms involved in hostile 
takeovers laid off workers, affecting about 6% of the workforce. 
It appears that similar patterns emerge in the aftermath of leveraged and management 
buyouts in the U.S. and U.K.  Based on data from U.S. evidence, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990b) 
report declines in levels of employment and wages of non-production workers at manufacturing 
plants that experience a buyout.  These patterns do not emerge for production workers, however.  
Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005) analyze British data and conclude that management buyouts 
result in a reduction in the labor intensity of production.    
 Bliss and Rosen (2001) analyze the effect of bank mergers on CEO compensation.  They 
report that these ownership changes have a positive effect on CEO remuneration.  In more than 
75% of the transactions they observed, the post-merger increase in CEO compensation exceeded 
10% of the CEO’s pre-merger remuneration.   
Others  have  directly  analyzed  the  effects  of  takeovers  on  the  compensation  of  non-
executive  employees.    Mitchell  and  Mulherin  (1989)  report  that  only  a  small  percentage  of 
corporate  takeovers  result  in  pension  fund  terminations.    Similarly,  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and 
Weisbach (1990) find that only 15% of hostile takeover bids and 8% of friendly takeover bids 
lead to pension fund terminations.  Rosett (1990) examines whether takeovers result in labor   7 
contract settlements that favor management, as opposed to workers.  He reports that takeover 
activity is unrelated to wage growth.  More importantly, Rosett concludes that, contrary to the 
Shleifer  and  Summers’  1988)  hypothesis,  the  gains  to  shareholders  arising  from  corporate 
takeovers do not appear to result from losses to employees. 
Although these studies are useful, they do not address the question of how ownership 
change affects different types of workers.  In the following section, we outline an econometric 
model that enables us to assess this issue.   
 
III. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS  
 
  In order to assess the impact of these transactions on “equity,” as opposed to efficiency or 
performance, we wish to examine two worker-related dependent variables: earnings and changes 
in  employment  status.    In  addition  to  conventional  determinants  of  these  variables,  we 
incorporate a set of dummy variables relating to ownership change, gender, and national origin, 
as well as conventional determinants of these factors.  
The base earnings equation that we estimate is:  
(1) ln(EARN)iet+1 = α + βln(EARN) iet-1  + γOCt + δXit-1 + φYet-1  + λt  + εit 
where α is an intercept term, EARN denotes the annual earnings of individual i working in 
establishment e of firm f in year t+1 or year t-1, OCt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plant 
experiences an ownership change in year t or 0 otherwise, Xit is a vector of individual-specific 
characteristics, Yet is a vector of establishment-specific characteristics, δ and φ are vectors of 
coefficients, λt is a year-specific fixed effect, and εit  is the remaining classical disturbance term.    
  The  vector  of  individual-specific  factors  Xit  includes  dummy  variables  for  gender, 
national origin, employee age, categories of educational attainment, field of education, location,   8 
and industry of occupation, along with a continuous measure of employee experience.
2  In our 
econometric analysis, we also interact the ownership change dummy variable with the gender 
and national origin variables, in order to determine whether these transactions have differential 
effects on various types of workers.  The establishment-specific variables, Yet, are plant age 
dummy variables (with separate dummies for each year of age), plant size (as measured by both 
the  logarithm  of  employment  and  the  logarithm  of  total  sales),  and  plant  average  employee 
earnings.
3  Industry dummies are included at the employee level, allowing industrial occupation 
to differ among workers in each plant. 
We also wish the estimate the relationship between ownership change and employment 
status  following  these  transactions  for  various  types  of  workers.    To  assess  this  issue,  we 
estimate a multinomial logit equation of the following form:  
 
(2) Prob (EMPSTATUSjiet+1) = α + βln(EARN) iet-1  + γOCt + δXit-1 + φYet-1 + λt  + εit 
 
where  EMPSTATUS  refers  to  employment  status  j  in  year  t  +1  of  individual  i  who  was 
employed in establishment e as of year t-1, and the other variables are defined as in equation (1).  
There are three possible employment statuses: a worker can be employed by the original or 
acquiring organization, employed by another organization, or unemployed.   
 
                                                 
2 Age is treated as a dummy variable because very young and very old workers in Sweden are often subject to 
mandatory restrictions on compensation.  
3 The year of establishment formation is unavailable in the data, so age dummies are included for establishments that 
enter after the first year of the sample, and separate dummies for establishments present in the first year are included 
for each calendar year (implying grouped ages 1 and up, 2 and up, etc. in successive years).   9 
IV. DATA  
  Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  linked,  longitudinal  employer-employee  data  on 
Swedish workers and plants that employ them.  The file covers every non-farm employee in 
Sweden in every year from 1985 to 1998.  The full database contains 36,398,617 records across 
the 14 years of data, for an average of 2.6 million workers per year, consistent with the Swedish 
population of close to 9 million.  Establishment level data  are available for the majority of 
employees  if  and  when  they  were  employed  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  so  that  9,251,962 
records  have  matching  information  available  about  the  employee’s  plant  (and  usually  firm) 
workplace. 
The  database  facilitates  our  investigation  of  employment  status  and  earnings.  
Employment is recorded each year in November, and given that the database covers virtually all 
employees, we infer that a worker whose record is missing in a given year was not employed (the 
phrase  “in  non-farm  activities”  is  hereafter  omitted)  in  Sweden  during  that  year.    Annual 
earnings are recorded from employees’ official tax filings, and are divided into earnings paid by 
an organization versus self-employment and other earnings.
4  Self-employment income serves as 
a proxy for whether the employee was self-employed, and we use the two sources of income to 
divide  each  working  employee  into  one  of  three  categories  in  each  year:  organizationally 
employed, self-employed, or both.   
For  individual  employees,  the  data  include  the  person’s  gender,  national  origin,  age, 
geographic  location,  year  of  last  educational  exam,  categorical  variables  for  educational 
attainment and field of education, and 5-digit SIC industry classification of employment.  In a 
previous paper (Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005)), we used parts of this information to 
construct plant-level measures of workforce characteristics, such as the percentage of workers 
                                                 
4 The data do not include hours worked or hourly wages, only annual total income, for specific employees.   10 
who are female, the percentage who were born in Sweden versus immigrated, the mean age of 
employees, mean experience as proxied by years elapsed since last year of education, and the 
percentage of employees with at least some college-level education.  Here we use the employee-
specific  data  in  each  year  as  controls  and  to  check  for  possible  differences  in  effects  of 
ownership change across different types of people. 
Each record contains data on gender and the national origin of the employee.  National 
origin is based on birthplace, divided between Sweden, other Nordic countries, the remainder of 
Europe, and five other world regions, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, and other 
nations.  Employees’ geographic locations, available for 99.6% of records, correspond to 338 
local governments.  Educational attainment and broad field of educational are likewise recorded 
categorically, and are available for 97% of records.  Attainment is categorized as 0-8 years, 9-10 
years (obligatory in Sweden), 11-12 years, 13-14 years (equivalent to a normal high  school 
education similar to U.S. grade twelve), college or university education for one to two years 
(including extended high school engineering programs), college or university education for three 
or more years but not PhD education, or PhD education.  Field of education is categorized as 
basic (general) education; esthetics, language, and religion; pedagogy; trade, office, economic, 
social, and behavioral degrees; industry-relevant education including handcrafts, engineering, 
mathematics,  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology;  transportation  and  communication;  caring 
including  nursing,  child  care,  and  geriatric  care;  farming,  gardening,  forestry,  and  fishing; 
general service skills including private guards and military service; or other areas of education.  
 The  data  record  the  year  of  an  employee’s  last  educational  examination  in  45%  of 
records, and a proxy for employee work experience is constructed in these cases as the logarithm 
of the number of years (including the last educational year) since finishing education.  This   11 
proxy for experience is likely to be an adequate control despite the paucity of information on 
educational examination year, because examination year information is mainly lacking among 
older employees, for whom age dummies (also included as control variables) provide a good 
proxy for experience.  The proxy for years of work experience may be better for male employees 
than female employees because males are more likely to work throughout the period following 
the last exam year, and accordingly we also include an interaction between years of experience 
and gender.  The employee’s current industry classification of activity, available in 97.6% of 
records, divides employees into one of 123 2-digit categories based on either 1969 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, used where available, or 1992 SIC codes, used in later 
years.  Given that 1969 and 1992 industrial classifications cannot be matched precisely, separate 
categories are used for 1969 versus 1992 industry codes.
5  Categorical variables (gender, national 
origin,  geographic  locations,  educational  attainment,  field  of  education,  and  industry)  are 
represented in our analyses using 0-1 dummy variables. 
Although employee, plant, or firm data are missing for some observations, we do not 
exclude any records from the sample on the basis of missing data, to avoid any potential sample 
selection bias.  Instead, we set the values of missing variables equal to the population mean or 
zero, and add dummy variables that equal one when the relevant type of data is unavailable or 
zero otherwise.  Hence all these variables are used as controls to the full extent possible, while 
records with missing observations are allowed a constant shift parameter in case they differ on 
average from records with available information. 
                                                 
5 This makes the industry categories perfectly multi-collinear with the year-specific dummy variables, requiring that 
an  appropriately  chosen  dummy  variable  be  dropped  from  the  model,  with  the  ramification  that  estimated 
coefficients of year and industry dummy variables cannot be construed to have their obvious meanings and hence 
are not reported but simply used as controls.   12 
  Following conventional international standards, the plant or establishment is defined as a 
physically independent unit within a firm.  Firms that are involved in multiple activities at the 
same physical address report separate figures for each activity, which are then assigned to a 
separate facility.  In most cases, however, firms focus on a single activity, implying that the local 
units are seldom split into several plants.  Plants that were considered to be “non-active” and 
“help plants,” such as sales offices (or what would be considered “auxiliary” establishments in 
the U.S.), were also excluded from the data. 
  Employment status is measured as follows.  Individuals were defined to have maintained 
their existing employment if they were employed in t+1 at the same plant as in t-1 or if they were 
employed in another plant owned by either their original employer or by the acquirer of their 
original  plant.    Employees  were  defined  to  have  found  new  employment  if  they  reported 
employment in any other firm.  The remaining individuals are classified as unemployed.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  employees  who  found  new  jobs  or  became  unemployed  were  not 
necessarily fired.  These employees may simply have found another job, retired, or left their 
previous job for any number of personal reasons.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
To assess the effects of ownership change on workers, we exploit the longitudinal nature 
of our data by analyzing employees before and after these transactions.  In the top panel of Table 
2, we present descriptive statistics on employees who were employed at manufacturing plants 
that are destined to experience an ownership change in the following year.  For comparative 
purposes, we have also constructed descriptive statistics on a random sample of employees who 
do not experience an ownership change in the following year.  Descriptive statistics for this   13 
random  sample  of  workers  are  presented  in  the  bottom  panel  of  Table  2.      Corresponding 
statistics  for  employees  who  are  observed  in  the  year  following  an  ownership  change  are 
presented in the top panel of Table 3.  Once again, we also report descriptive statistics for a 
random sample of employees who did not experience an ownership change in the preceding year 
in the bottom panel of Table 3.     
Table  2  reveals  that  in  the  ownership  change  sample,  86.5%  of  the  workers  are  of 
Swedish origin and 27.4% are female.  The average level of experience is 9.51 years and the 
mean  yearly  earnings  is  147,000  SEK.    Within  this  group  some  differences  between  the 
nationalities emerge.  The figures reveal that, on average (without controlling for human capital 
variables),  non-Swedish  employees  earn  less  than  Swedish  employees.    African,  South 
American, and especially Asian employees appear to earn, on average, significantly less than 
other non-Swedish employees.  These employees also have the least experience.  Other European 
employees have, on average, nearly 4 more years of experience than their Swedish counterparts, 
but still earn close to 10% less.   
The sample is compared with 447,411 individual-year combinations randomly selected 
from the population of manufacturing employees whose plants will not be sold in the following 
year.  It appears that workers whose establishments are destined to be sold have lower mean 
levels of education, experience, and earnings than the random sample of manufacturing workers.  
Note that these differentials hold for each national origin category (with the exception of “rest of 
world” for experience).  Similar patterns emerge in Table 3, which presents descriptive statistics 
on workers who are observed in the aftermath of an ownership change.   
In the top panel of Table 4, we present descriptive statistics on the mobility of workers 
whose establishments were sold in the previous year.  The bottom panel of this table contains   14 
descriptive  statistics  for  a  random  sample  of  workers  whose  plants  did  not  experience  an 
ownership change.  Several stylized facts emerge.  It appears that mergers and acquisitions result 
in a substantial increase in worker mobility.  We also find that all types of workers are more 
likely to become unemployed when ownership change occurs, a result that is consistent with 
previous plant and firm-level studies reporting that mergers and acquisitions result in downsizing 
(Conyon, Girma, Thompson, Wright (2002a), Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005)).   
There  is  substantial  variation  in  worker  outcomes  across  the  different  national  origin 
categories.    In  fact,  all  of  the  minority  groups  exhibit  substantially  higher  unemployment 
probabilities.  North Americans and Asians in particular stand out as being especially likely to 
become unemployed (in Sweden) after a merger or acquisition.  In both the ownership change 
sample  and  the  random  sample,  it  is  evident  that  all  of  the  Non-European  groups  exhibit 
substantially  lower  probabilities  than  Europeans  (including  Nordic  and  Swedish  groups)  of 
maintaining employment in the same plant.  While the reasons for this are not clear, the effect is 
5%-15%, which is substantial.   
Although the descriptive patterns presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are interesting, they do 
not include controls for the determinants of changes in earnings and worker mobility.  Table 5 
presents parameter estimates from regressions of the earnings equation.  The OLS estimates of 
the earning equations are based on the specification outlined in equation (1).  In Column (1), we 
constrain the effects of ownership change to be the same for all workers.  In Column (2) we relax 
that restriction, allowing the effects of ownership change to differ for females and non-Swedes. 
Note that, as expected from human capital theory, the coefficients on lagged earnings and a set of 
dummy variables for post-secondary education (not shown on the table) are all positive and 
highly  statistically  significant.    Contrary  to  expectations,  the  coefficient  on  experience  is   15 
negative  and  significant.    We  also find  that  on  average,  women  earn  19.3%  less  than  men, 
controlling  for  the  above  variables  plus  location,  industry,  age,  education,  and  experience.  
Foreign-born  employees  also  appear  to  earn  significantly  lower  wages  than  their  Swedish 
counterparts, especially Asian and South American workers.   
We  now  focus  our  attention  on  the  coefficients  on  the  ownership  change  dummy 
variables  and  the  interaction  terms  with  the  gender  and  national  origin  variables,  shown  in 
column (2).  Consistent with previous plant-level studies (e.g., Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom 
(2005)), we find that ownership change is associated with a reduction in earnings.  On average, 
there appears to be a 1.5% (1.3% including the interaction terms) decline in earnings growth 
(relative to employees whose plant did not experience ownership change) between the year prior 
to the change and the year after the change.   
However,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  almost  all  of  the  interaction  terms  involving 
ownership change, gender, and national origin are statistically insignificant.  The exception is the 
interaction term involving workers who were born in other European countries.  Thus, although 
women and minorities have lower earnings growth than male Swedish employees (controlling 
for age, education, and experience), mergers and acquisitions do not appear to exacerbate this 
inequality. 
Next,  we  turn  to  a  different  dependent  variable:  employments  the  probability  of 
unemployment.  These multinomial logit regression findings are presented in Table 6.  Recall 
that there are three possible employment statuses: a worker can be employed by the original or 
acquiring organization, employed by another organization, or unemployed.  In the multinomial 
logit regressions, the base case is being employed by the same firm or by the new owner.  Once 
again, we estimate variants of the model: In Columns (1) and (2), the effects of ownership   16 
change are constrained be the same for all workers, while in Columns (3) and (4), the effects of 
ownership change are allowed to differ for females and non-Swedes.    
The results imply that the probability of moving to another firm or becoming unemployed 
declines with higher earnings and experience.  It also appears that women are less likely, ceteris 
paribus, to leave the organization or being unemployed.  Most importantly, we find that mergers 
and acquisitions significantly increase the likelihood of inter-firm mobility and unemployment.  
Note that the interaction terms between the ownership change, gender, and minority variables are 
almost  all  not  positive  and  significant  (with  the  exception  of  the  interactions  between  the 
ownership  change  dummy  variables  and  the  dummies  for  European  origin  for  switching  to 
another  firm  and  North  American  origin  for  unemployment).    Indeed,  the  findings  strongly 
suggest that ownership change reduces the likelihood that female workers will be transferred to 
another firm or fired (both interaction terms are negative and highly significant).  In general, the 
results imply that women and minority do not experience a greater incidence of unemployment 
or firm transfer due to ownership change.   
 
VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
Although  there  have  been  numerous  papers  on  the  employment  and  wage  effects  of 
mergers and acquisitions, there has been no direct analysis of the impact of such ownership 
changes on minority and female workers.  This is an unexplored “equity” dimension of these 
transactions. Shleifer and Summers (1987) assert that in order to accurately assess the welfare 
implications  of  changes  in  corporate  ownership,  researchers  must  also  assess  equity  effects.  
Given data constraints, this has been a difficult, if not impossible, assignment.      17 
To accomplish this objective, we analyze linked employer-employee data for the entire 
population of Swedish workers and approximately 16,000 manufacturing plants for the period 
1985-1998, which allows us to control for additional factors that might result in changes in labor 
composition and relative compensation.  Our findings suggest that ownership change does not 
significantly  reduce  the  relative  earnings  and  employment  status  of  women  and  minority 
workers.    Although  we  confirm  the  existence  of  wage  and  employment  status  disparities, 
mergers and acquisitions do not appear to exacerbate these inequalities.  
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Changes  in  Ownership  of 
Manufacturing Plants 
Labor Input Growth Rates Were Lower For 
Plants Changing Owners Than Comparable 
Plants Before the Transaction; Slightly Higher 






Medoff (1988)  
 
3 Types of  
Ownership Change Involving 
Firms :   
Simple Sales, Assets-Only 
Sales, Mergers 
Simple Sales: 9% Increase in Employment, 
5% Decline in Wages;  
Assets-Only Sale: 5% Decline in Employment, 
5% Increase in Wages; 
Mergers: 2% Increase in Employment, 4% 








A Small Percentage of Takeovers Result in 






Hostile Takeovers of Firms  
45% of the Firms Involved in Hostile 
Takeovers Laid Off Workers  
(Approximately 6% of the Workforce)  
Pontiff, 





Tender Offers  
(Corporate Takeovers) 
 
15% of Hostile Takeover Bids and 8% of 







Plant-Level Analysis of  
Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) 
and Management Buyouts 
(MBOs) of Divisions and 
Firms  
 
Employment and Wages of  
Non-production Workers at Plants   
(But Not Production Workers) Declines  










Changes in Ownership of 
Manufacturing Plants and  
Auxiliary Establishments  
Employment and Wage Growth is 
Significantly Lower in Auxiliary 
Establishments Changing Owners Than in 
Those Not Changing Owners, But Not for 
R&D Employees; Much Smaller Effects at 







Gains to Shareholders Arising From Corporate 
Takeovers Do Not Appear to be the Result of 








Related and Unrelated 
Mergers; 
Spin-offs  
Mergers and Spin-offs Had Very Little Impact 
on Labor Costs; Related Mergers Had a 
Positive Impact on Wages; Mergers Had A 
Negative Impact on Employment and 
Compensation of Non-Production Workers   
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Selected Studies of the Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on Employment and Compensation  
 






Changes in Ownership 
of Manufacturing 
Plants    
For Representative Plants, Wages and 
Employment Increase After Ownership Change; 
Effects Worse For  
Workers in Large Plants  
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Mergers Have a Positive Effect on CEO 
Compensation; More Than 75% of The Mergers 
Led To An Increase in CEO Compensation 
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Mergers  
19% Decline in Employment for Related 






Related and Unrelated 
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Increases in Wages For All Mergers, But 







Mergers Do Not Reduce Labor Demand in the 
U.S.; There is a 10% Decline in Labor Demand 
in Europe in the Aftermath of Mergers 




Plants Involved in an MBO Experience a 
Substantial Reduction in Employment   22 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics For Employees at Plants That Will Be Sold in the Following Year 
              All         Swedish 
All Non-           







Number of Observations  443,543  383,528  60,015  31,602  18,345  1,276  5,853  600  1,990  349 
Percent of Sample  100.00%  86.47%  13.53%  7.12%  4.14%  0.29%  1.32%  0.14%  0.45%  0.08% 
Percent Female  27.36%  26.58%  32.35%  34.15%  32.59%  16.54%  28.34%  25.83%  25.23%  33.24% 
Average Experience (Years)  9.51  9.39  10.72  10.46  13.30  7.89  7.35  9.18  5.59  11.63 
Percent  with  Post  High  School 
Education  57.6%  59.7%  44.0%  38.8%  52.4%  46.1%  42.2%  53.3%  50.0%  48.1% 
Average Earnings (SEK)  146,866 kr  149,040 kr  132,978 kr  136,104 kr  134,984 kr  122,041 kr  114,100 kr  143,368 kr  124,230 kr  133,112 kr 
 
Descriptive Statistics For A Random Sample of Employees That Will Not Be Sold in the Following Year 
  All  Swedish 
All Non-







Number of Observations  447,411  390,914  56,497  29,723  17,581  1,116  5,337  612  1,771  357 
Percent of Sample  100.00%  87.37%  12.63%  6.64%  3.93%  0.25%  1.19%  0.14%  0.40%  0.08% 
Percent Female  26.64%  25.81%  32.44%  33.96%  32.60%  18.64%  29.12%  25.65%  25.69%  36.69% 
Average Experience (Years)  9.76  9.62  11.29  11.00  13.81  8.41  7.99  9.41  9.04  9.71 
Percent  with  Post  High  School 
Education  59.4%  61.3%  46.6%  40.7%  54.9%  53.8%  53.8%  60.1%  55.1%  48.7% 
Average Earnings (SEK)  153,138 kr  155,130 kr  139,358 kr  141,471 kr  142,406 kr  131,267 kr  117,984 kr  163,171 kr  134,959 kr  139,114 kr 
   23 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics For Workers at Plants That Were Sold in the Previous Year 
           
  All  Swedish 
All Non-







Number of Observations  340,840  297,212  43,628  23,558  13,467  869  3,771  389  1,334  240 
Percent of Sample  100.00%  87.20%  12.80%  6.91%  3.95%  0.25%  1.11%  0.11%  0.39%  0.07% 
Percent Female  26.02%  25.17%  31.79%  20.68%  31.51%  16.69%  29.49%  24.16%  24.29%  34.17% 
Average Experience (Years)  11.62  11.46  13.08  12.49  15.76  10.01  9.79  11.91  11.08  13.07 
Percent  with  Post  High  School 
Education  60.5%  62.1%  49.1%  42.9%  58.3%  53.9%  48.9%  66.1%  59.3%  52.5% 
Average Earnings (SEK)  171,853 kr  173,491 kr  157,434 kr  158,819 kr  158,172 kr  155,442 kr  145,128 kr  177,389 kr  155,407 kr  159,603 kr 
 
Descriptive Statistics For A Random Sample of Employees at Plants That Were Not Sold in the Previous Year 
  All  Swedish 
All Non-







Number of Observations  343,963  302,726  41,237  22,291  12,915  750  3,432  419  1,173  257 
Percent of Sample  100.00%  88.01%  11.99%  6.48%  3.75%  0.22%  1.00%  0.12%  0.34%  0.07% 
Percent Female  25.55%  24.69%  31.87%  33.55%  31.64%  18.53%  28.09%  26.25%  23.61%  33.85% 
Average Experience (Years)  11.70  11.55  13.30  12.94  15.83  10.25  9.78  11.30  10.88  12.02 
Percent  with  Post  High  School 
Education  61.2%  62.7%  49.9%  43.3%  58.4%  60.4%  51.7%  66.3%  63.4%  53.7% 
Average Earnings (SEK)  175,648 kr  177,770 kr  160,076 kr  161,182 kr  160,641 kr  161,376 kr  146,210 kr  179,795 kr  165,317 kr  161,059 kr 
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Table 4  
Where Do Workers Go? 
 
Employment Status of Workers Whose Plants Were Sold in the Previous Year  
           
Employment Status in Year t+1  All  Swedish 
All Non-







Employed in Same Plant  62.77%  63.25%  59.85%  61.16%  61.18%  54.08%  52.92%  47.28%  54.85%  54.43% 
Employed in Different Plant Owned 
by Same Firm  2.21%  2.20%  2.26%  3.12%  1.54%  0.51%  0.67%  1.81%  1.00%  2.53% 
Employed in Different Plant Owned 
by OC Firm  2.48%  2.50%  2.33%  2.20%  2.40%  4.68%  2.51%  2.36%  1.83%  1.90% 
Employed in Same 4-digit Industry  2.79%  2.78%  2.80%  2.94%  2.65%  3.23%  2.38%  3.44%  2.72%  3.16% 
Employed in other Manufacturing or 
Mining Industry  5.89%  5.93%  5.65%  5.45%  6.27%  3.91%  5.43%  3.80%  5.82%  3.80% 
Employed  in  Industry  other  than 
Manufacturing or Mining  5.86%  6.13%  4.22%  4.04%  3.99%  5.19%  4.89%  7.79%  5.49%  4.75% 
Employed in an Unknown Industry  0.04%  0.04%  0.03%  0.03%  0.04%  0.00%  0.04%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Unemployed  or  Employed  Outside 
of Sweden  17.96%  17.16%  22.85%  21.06%  21.84%  28.41%  31.17%  33.52%  28.28%  29.43% 
 
Employment Status of A Random Sample of Workers Whose Plants Were Not Sold in the Previous Year 
Employment Status in Year t+1  All  Swedish 
All Non-







Employed in Same Plant  71.92%  72.38%  68.79%  70.08%  70.77%  62.32%  58.82%  61.25%  63.00%  67.56% 
Employed in Different Plant Owned 
by Same Firm  2.21%  2.18%  2.38%  2.57%  2.23%  2.85%  2.12%  2.21%  1.35%  2.08% 
Employed in Different Plant Owned 
by OC Firm  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Employed in Same 4-digit Industry  2.03%  2.02%  2.07%  2.33%  1.67%  1.93%  1.98%  1.85%  2.12%  2.08% 
Employed in other Manufacturing or 
Mining Industry  4.30%  4.37%  3.84%  3.89%  3.45%  4.38%  4.71%  2.77%  4.89%  2.08% 
Employed  in  Industry  other  than 
Manufacturing or Mining  4.97%  5.19%  3.49%  3.13%  3.44%  3.87%  4.65%  8.49%  4.76%  3.87% 
Employed in an Unknown Industry  0.04%  0.04%  0.03%  0.05%  0.03%  0.00%  0.02%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Unemployed  or  Employed  Outside 
of Sweden  14.53%  13.82%  19.38%  17.96%  18.41%  24.64%  27.71%  23.44%  23.88%  22.33%   22 
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Table 5 
OLS Estimates of Earnings Equations  
                                 Dependent Variable: Log Earnings in the Year After An Ownership Change  
 
Coefficient on: 
Ownership Change Effects 
Same for All Individuals  
Ownership Change Effects 
Allowed to Differ For Females and 
Non-Swedes 
Log (t-1) Earnings            .557*** 
    (.003) 
         .557*** 
    (.003) 
Log Experience           -.016*** 
    (.002) 
         -.016*** 
    (.002) 
Log Experience * Female           .-.012*** 
    (.001) 
         -.012*** 
    (.001) 
Female          -.193*** 
    (.002) 
        -.190*** 
    (.003) 
Nordic           -.043*** 
    (.003) 
        -.040*** 
     (.004) 
Europe           -.108*** 
    (.004) 
         -.099*** 
     (.005) 
Africa          -.088*** 
   (.015) 
         -.080*** 
     (.021) 
Asia          -.132*** 
   (.009) 
         -.136*** 
     (.012) 
North America    -.047* 
   (.022) 
       -.069* 
      (.031) 
South America          -.054*** 
   (.012) 
       -.045* 
       (.018) 
Rest of the World        -.019** 
    (.024) 
     -.039 
      (.035) 
OCt          -.015*** 
    (.001) 
           -.013*** 
      (.001) 
OCt * Female        -.005  
     (.003) 
OCt * Nordic        -.007 
     (.005) 
OCt * Europe         -.018* 
    (.008) 
OCt * Africa       -.014 
    (.030) 
OCt * Asia        .006 
   (.017) 
OCt * North America       .045 
   (.044) 
OCt * South America      -.018 
   (.025) 
OCt * Rest of the World      -.042 
  (.049) 
Constant           5.718*** 
    (.112) 
        5.713*** 
    (.112) 
R
2  .495     .495 
Notes: N=719,847. Controls include worker education, age, plant age, location, and industry dummies.  All 
independent variables are observed at t-1, except that ownership change is observed at t.  †p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, 
*** p<.001, two-tailed significance levels using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.   26 
Table 6 
Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability of Being Unemployed  
 Dependent Variable: Probability of Unemployment A Year After An Ownership Change  
Ownership Change Effects Same 
for All Individuals 
Ownership Change Effects 







Unemployed  Switched to 
Another Firm 
Unemployed  
Log (t-1) Earnings           -.491 *** 
    (.007) 
      -1.216*** 
  (.007) 
         -.491*** 
    (.007) 
       -1.215*** 
    (.007) 
Log Experience          -.100*** 
    (.008) 
      -.093*** 
  (.009) 
         -.100*** 
    (.008) 
         -.093*** 
    (.009) 
Log Experience * Female        .016* 
    (.008) 
       -.032 *** 
   (.008) 
       .015* 
    (.008) 
         -.033*** 
    (.008) 
Female          -.421*** 
    (.011) 
      -.156*** 
  (.011) 
         -.015*** 
    (.009) 
   -.128*** 
    (.014) 
Nordic   .020 
    (.014) 
        .432*** 
    (.014) 
    -.015 
   (.022) 
         .487*** 
   (.020) 
Europe           -.166*** 
    (.018) 
       .251*** 
   (.018) 
         -.247*** 
    (.028) 
         .261*** 
    (.026) 
Africa          -.323*** 
    (.067) 
        .640*** 
  (.059) 
      -.230* 
    (.102) 
        .611*** 
    (.093) 
Asia          -.160*** 
    (.032) 
        .699*** 
    (.029) 
    -.072 
      (.047) 
        .727*** 
   (.042) 
North America  .042 
    (.092)  
       .723*** 
  (.088) 
      .053 
   (.134) 
         .513*** 
   (.136) 
South America  -.047 
    (.053) 
        .714*** 
  (.050) 
      .026 
   (.080) 
        .772*** 
   (.074) 
Rest of the World  -.104 
    (.129) 
.260* 
  (.120) 
   -.211 
    (.196) 
   .230 
    (.166) 
OCt          .498*** 
    (.007) 
       .365*** 
  (.008) 
          .518*** 
    (.009) 
          .391*** 
    (.009) 
OCt * Female              -.106*** 
    (.016) 
        -.055*** 
    (.016) 
OCt * Nordic             .060* 
    (.028) 
       -.099*** 
    (.027) 
OCt * Europe                  .138*** 
     (.036) 
   -.018 
    (.035) 
OCt * Africa         -.162 
     (.134) 
   .046 
    (.120) 
OCt * Asia          -.159* 
    (.062) 
   -.054 
    (.056) 
OCt * North America         -.007 
    (.184) 
      .383* 
    (.178) 
OCt * South America         -.128 
    (.106) 
   -.106 
    (.098) 
OCt * Rest of the World          .195 
   (.262) 
   .064 
   (.240) 
Psuedo R
2  .172     .172 
Notes: N=804,535. Controls include worker education, age, plant age, location, and industry 
dummies.  All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that ownership change is 
observed at t.  †p<.10, p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed significance levels using 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 